Cognitivist Presumptions of Moral Realism in Justification of Moral Truths

Basit Öğe Kaydı
dc.contributor.authorUslu, Ayse
dc.date.accessioned2024-08-23T16:03:40Z
dc.date.available2024-08-23T16:03:40Z
dc.date.issued2024en_US
dc.departmentDüzce Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractThis study critically examines the foundational principles of impartiality and value independence advocated by moral realist epistemologies in the pursuit of objectivity. Central to moral realists is the cognitivist presupposition necessitating a clear distinction between cognitive and emotional components inherent in moral judgments. The investigation focuses on the cognitive-emotional dichotomy underlying the moral realist perspectives of David Enoch and Thomas Nagel. The research findings unveil that the interplay between cognition and emotion, as evidenced by experimental data, poses a formidable challenge to the traditional understanding of impartiality and value independence. The article's initial section delves into the ontological nature of moral judgments, followed by an exploration of the cognitive assumptions shaping Nagel and Enoch's conceptualizations of objectivity. The final section elucidates the cognitive-emotional interdependence that disrupts the conditions of impartiality and value independence, conventionally posited as prerequisites for objectivity.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.29228/beytulhikme.76127
dc.identifier.endpage366en_US
dc.identifier.issn1303-8303
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage345en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.29228/beytulhikme.76127
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12684/13863
dc.identifier.volume14en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:001266942800003en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/Aen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.institutionauthorUslu, Ayseen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherBeytulhikme Felsefe Cevresien_US
dc.relation.ispartofBeytulhikme-An International Journal of Philosophyen_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectObjectivityen_US
dc.subjectmoral realismen_US
dc.subjectcognitivismen_US
dc.subjectmoral truthen_US
dc.subjectimpartialityen_US
dc.subjectemotionen_US
dc.subjectEmbodied Cognitionen_US
dc.titleCognitivist Presumptions of Moral Realism in Justification of Moral Truthsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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