Cognitivist Presumptions of Moral Realism in Justification of Moral Truths
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2024
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Beytulhikme Felsefe Cevresi
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
This study critically examines the foundational principles of impartiality and value independence advocated by moral realist epistemologies in the pursuit of objectivity. Central to moral realists is the cognitivist presupposition necessitating a clear distinction between cognitive and emotional components inherent in moral judgments. The investigation focuses on the cognitive-emotional dichotomy underlying the moral realist perspectives of David Enoch and Thomas Nagel. The research findings unveil that the interplay between cognition and emotion, as evidenced by experimental data, poses a formidable challenge to the traditional understanding of impartiality and value independence. The article's initial section delves into the ontological nature of moral judgments, followed by an exploration of the cognitive assumptions shaping Nagel and Enoch's conceptualizations of objectivity. The final section elucidates the cognitive-emotional interdependence that disrupts the conditions of impartiality and value independence, conventionally posited as prerequisites for objectivity.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Objectivity, moral realism, cognitivism, moral truth, impartiality, emotion, Embodied Cognition
Kaynak
Beytulhikme-An International Journal of Philosophy
WoS Q Değeri
N/A
Scopus Q Değeri
Cilt
14
Sayı
2
